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[Abstract]
The nine justices of the Supreme Court are traditionally expected to vote out a binding
ruling because its compelling legal reasoning convinces a majority of the justices to support it,
but can such reasoning convince regular Americans? Existing literature on the Court as a
legitimizer of policies focuses on the causality between the Court’s mere endorsement of a policy
and greater public support for that policy. I investigate whether the Court’s reasoning, either on
its own or along with the Court’s endorsement, could impact public opinion. Using an online
survey experiment on a nationally representative sample of 1399 respondents, I find that the
Court’s reasoning, regardless of whether the Court’s endorsement is presented, increases public
support for its position overall. Specifically, this is because Democrats respond to the Court’s
reasoning from conservative decisions and increase their support for those positions accordingly,
but Republicans don’t respond to such conservative reasoning. Neither Democrats nor
Republicans respond to liberal reasoning.
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Literature Review
The Supreme Court justices are traditionally expected to interpret the Constitution
faithfully regardless of the partisanship of the president who appointed them. According to this
expectation, when the nine justices vote behind closed doors, the policy position of one side
overcomes the other because the compelling legal reasoning behind the former position
convinces a majority of the justices to support it. After a vote is reached, an appointed justice
representing that majority then writes up a detailed opinion containing an elaborate argument for
why the adopted policy stance is correct, drawing from precedents, reasoning in the oral
arguments, evidence from amici briefs, and more.
But can such reasoning actually convince regular Americans? How does information
about the reasoning provided by these rulings change Americans’ stance on the policy issue in
question? How does voters’ partisanship interact with such an intervention? Previous research on
the legitimacy-conferring function of the Court focuses on the causality between the Court’s
mere endorsement of a policy stance and greater public support for that stance. Building on this
literature, I investigate whether the Court’s reasoning, either on its own or along with the Court’s
endorsement, could impact public opinion. Using a pre-registered online survey experiment on a
nationally representative sample of 1399 respondents, I find that consistent with existing
experimental evidence, the Court’s endorsement alone does little, if any, to increase support for
its position. However, the Court’s exact reasoning, regardless of whether its endorsement is
presented, does increase public support for its position overall. Moreover, this is mostly driven
by Democrats, rather than Republicans, responding to the Court’s reasoning. Specifically, this is
because Democrats respond to the Court’s reasoning from conservative decisions and increase
their support for those positions accordingly, but Republicans don’t respond to such conservative
reasoning. Neither Democrats nor Republicans respond to liberal reasoning.
The question of whether and how the Supreme Court could exert opinion leadership over
the American public by ruling for or against a particular policy has lingered in the minds of
social scientists for a while. Dahl’s (1957) classical thesis on the Supreme Court as a legitimizer
of national policy laid the cornerstone for many scholars to hypothesize that public support
inherently increases for the position that the Court adopts (for a complete review of this
literature, see Hoekstra and Segal 1996). Franklin and Kosaki (1989) title this theory the positive
response hypothesis: the Court’s decisions are seen as right and give rise to popular support of
the relevant policy because of the Court’s image of institutional credibility and legitimacy among
the American public. They empirically show that the explanatory power of this theory is limited
when it comes to examining the structure of public opinion change toward abortion in the wake
of Roe v. Wade (1973). Instead, they argue for a structural response hypothesis in which the
Court increases the intensity of within-group opinions about the pertinent policy. The Court’s
role is more akin to an agenda setter, spotlighting certain policy issues for public debate. Johnson
and Martin (1998) theorize that the High Court could “affect public opinion when it initially
rules on a salient issue, but that subsequent decisions on the same issue will have little influence
on opinion” in their conditional response hypothesis. They examined public opinion on an
abortion case and three capital punishment rulings and found that although the first major
landmark decision on a salient issue increases cleavages between groups on that issue,
subsequent cases within the same issue area have little effect.
Regardless of the exact motivating theory, this line of observational research suffers a
clear methodological flaw. “The modus operandi of these studies is to examine national public
opinion about questions decided by the Court before and after the Court’s decision.” (Hoekstra
and Segal 1996) This approach conflates the effect that the Court could have on public opinion
by simply endorsing a policy decision and any number of effects that are brought about in the
real world by the Court taking such an action. Before a Court ruling is made, there are often
highly visible political campaigns mounted by enthusiastic activists on both sides of the issue
attempting to influence public opinion in their way; after a decision is released, there also comes
heightened media attention, with commentators rushing to explain the meaning and foreseeable
policy impact of the decision. Numerous observable and unobservable factors might change
simultaneously with the Court’s release of a decision that could impact public opinion that it is
nearly impossible to cleanly identify what role the Court played exactly in this way. Because of
this observational approach, these studies also limit themselves to only cases that are already
well-known among the populace or respondents who have prior knowledge about the given
decision. (Franklin and Kosaki 1989, Johnson and Martin 1998)
A number of studies have also tried to tackle this question experimentally, randomly
manipulating knowledge of a given policy stance being supported by the Court to delineate the
effect of the Court’s endorsement itself on public opinion. These studies come with their own
insufficiencies, particularly concerning external validity, and many studies produce inconclusive,
vague, and conflicting results. Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg (2001), for example, used a
non-representative small sample of 206 predominantly white, male political science students
from Purdue University. This sample was not even representative of American college students
as it was much more conservative than even the general public. This casts doubt on their finding
that having the Supreme Court as the source cue instead of the bureaucracy could increase
support for affirmative action and phone regulation policy. Hoekstra (1995) and Baas and
Thomas (1984) also worked with even smaller samples of college political science students.
They produce somewhat conflicting evidence, as Hoekstra found the Court was able to legitimize
a policy stance under some circumstances, especially for those who viewed the Court positively,
but Baas and Thomas found no effect. Mondak (1990) used hypothetical rather than real cases,
which presents a different kind of external validity issue; he also used a sample with only about
two dozen college students per treatment condition. Nicholson and Hansford (2014) provide a
more conclusive account of this question. By embedding experiments within the 2011
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), an online national stratified sample survey of
15,000 respondents, they found a statistically significant impact on two of the four cases, but the
effect was substantively small: “The largest estimate for this variable is for the campaign finance
decision, but attributing this decision to the Court, as compared to no institutional source,
increases the probability of a respondent strongly accepting the decision by only .026.”
Crucially, the existing literature has not addressed the issue of whether the Court’s
reasoning, as opposed to or in conjunction with the Court’s endorsement, helps influence public
opinion. Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg (2001) did not distinguish between the Court’s
reasoning and pure endorsement, since their survey instrument involved fictitious news articles
on the Court’s ruling, which “contained detailed information about the policy decision and the
impact of that decision.” It also didn’t base its intervention on actual reasoning from the Court.
The same could be said about other experimental studies in this area. Moreover, Nicholson and
Hansford (2014) tested the respondents' “acceptance” of the decision as “the final word on the
matter,” rather than opinion on the policy itself. A respondent doesn’t necessarily have to change
her mind about an issue to agree that the Court should have the final word on the matter.
Therefore, the present study sets out to address these two issues together, namely, the lack of
testing of the persuasive capability of the Court’s actual reasoning on the opinion change rather
than decision acceptance of the public.
Chapter 2. Theory and Hypotheses
Building on a line of research on the Court’s role as the legitimizer of public policy since
Dahl (1957), I explore whether the reasoning that the Court provided in its rulings can influence
public opinion in an attempt to explain the mechanism through which the Supreme Court may
persuade regular Americans to agree with its policy positions. I first discuss how the reasoning
matters for the justices and legal professionals; I then address why such reasoning could, or even
should, matter for the public as well.
Justices provide detailed arguments for their rulings. One likely reason for this is that a
justice wants not only to convince future justices, legal professionals, or the laity to agree with
her ruling; she also wants them to agree for the same reasons as she does. Surely, cynicism
signature to our divisive time could easily drive us to dismiss an upright image of the Court’s
functioning as nine justices critically engaging with complex arguments and voting out the most
legally compelling one; we are very tempted to simply think of the justices as ideologues on the
bench who rule in however way that pleases their own policy preferences. However, the common
occurrence of the filing of concurring opinions speaks to the reality that justices care about why a
certain ruling is the way it is. The concurring opinion is a separate opinion of a justice who
agrees with the ruling reached by the majority but explains reasons why the justice decides to do
so that are different from or additional to the binding opinion. In fact, justices may even concur
in part and dissent in part with the ruling, which showcases just how much they care about the
precise reasoning behind a certain ruling, regardless of whether they nonetheless vote for that
ruling. Concurring opinions are so common that 40% of the decisions of the Burger, Rehnquist,
and Roberts Courts, the three most recent Courts, have at least one concurring opinion. (Sunstein
2015) “In the 2009 Term, over three-quarters of the opinions published by the Supreme Court of
the United States included a concurring opinion written by an individual Justice.” (Moore 2012)
Some legal scholars are even starting to complain about there being too many concurring
opinions. (Penrose 2020)
Reasoning also matters for other legal professionals, as future lawyers for generations
might rely on the most minor detail in the reasoning to build their case a century later. Contrary
to relative scholarly inattentiveness from the political science literature, legal scholars zealously
debate the meaning of the reasoning of the Supreme Court. These legal professionals are the
most direct intended audience whom the justices attempt to influence and persuade.
This gives rise to the question: would such reasoning also matter for the American
public? It is worth noting that although perhaps few among the American public can elaborate on
the intricacies of the reasoning of any particular Supreme Court decision, should they be
challenged to do so on the street, this does not mean that such reasoning is completely absent
from media awareness, and consequently, public perception.
On the contrary, as landmark Supreme Court decisions routinely receive heightened
media exposure, journalistic accounts also routinely feature some version of explanations on the
reasoning of the Supreme Court. To give just one example of how the media may do so, I turn to
a New York Times article reporting on the decision of Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), which
is included in my survey design. (Liptak 2020) In this case, the Supreme Court rules that
LGBTQ+ employees cannot be discriminated against by their employers on the basis of their
gender identity or sexual orientation. When reporting on this case, the New York Times article
carefully quotes the majority opinion penned by Justice Gorsuch, contrasted by the reasoning
provided by several dissenting justices. The article clearly points out that the main reasoning in
this decision is that “an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender
fires that person for traits or actions it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.
It is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without
discriminating against that individual based on sex.” Since discrimination based on sex is
explicitly banned under the Civil Rights Act, so does discrimination based on sexual orientation
or gender identity.
Moreover, a Supreme Court justice’s opinion may have an impact on public opinion,
regardless of whether it was written with that purpose in mind. Famously, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
has long been immortalized by the popular media as the pioneering legal giant of gender equality
advocacy in the public memory. Ginsburg’s poignant dissenting opinions in many landmark
decisions received much media attention and became influential way beyond the Court’s canon
or the legal academia.
Of course, the media have always understandably been more focused on the story behind
the case, empirical evidence in support of and against the debated policy position, projected
future influence of the ruling, and various other aspects of the judgment, as opposed to the often
arcane legal reasoning. However, the public being generally unengaged with the Court’s exact
reasoning right now is all the more reason why the media should pay more attention to such
reasoning. As the gatekeeper of public discourse, the media should be concerned about why the
Court is reaching a certain ruling, according to itself, and disentangle the legal jargons for the
public to better put on a check on the enormous power of judicial review. The present study, in
part, can show what could be the impact on public opinion if the media committed more efforts
to this end.
By neglecting the reasoning that the Court gave for its rulings, previous experimental
evidence on the legitimacy-conferring function of the Court has not adequately studied a
mechanism through which the Court could influence public opinion. When one encounters a
Supreme Court decision in real life, often through media reports, one could also be exposed to
other information relevant to this decision, which may include some account of the reasoning
that the Court gave for its decision. This exposure, coupled with the Court’s endorsement, may
be more impactful in persuading the American public than the endorsement alone, as
endorsement alone has been empirically shown as having little effect. Since existing survey
experiments have focused on examining whether the Court’s endorsement alone could change
public opinion on a certain policy stance and find little effect, I examine the influence that the
Court could exert by providing reasoning alongside its endorsement. Therefore, my main
hypothesis is:
Exposure to the Supreme Court’s reasoning behind a ruling makes the public more likely𝐻
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to support the Court’s policy stance.
Moreover, such reasoning could also increase public favorability toward the Court, since
the Court could be perceived as more reasonable and trustworthy if its reasoning is actually
persuasive.




I also pay special attention to possible heterogeneous effects. Most crucially, Democrats
and Republicans may respond differently to being told about the reasoning behind liberal or
conservative decisions. Considering this, when choosing the Supreme Court decisions to present
to the respondents, I choose two liberal decisions and two conservative decisions. Operating
under a no-deception constraint, I can only present truthful information about what the ruling
actually is and its authentic reasoning. This means that I cannot directly compare whether
Democrats are more susceptible to be influenced by a liberal decision’s reasoning than
Republicans are by a conservative decision’s reasoning, since these liberal decisions are
fundamentally different from conservative decisions; however, I can still observe how Democrats
and Republicans may respond differently to the same decision, though I cannot show such
relationship to be a causal one.
For example, Democrats might be more influenced by the Court’s reasoning when it
comes to a liberal decision because they find it compelling, whereas Republicans might be
uninfluenced. On the other hand, Democrats might be not influenced at all by the Court’s
reasoning in a liberal decision, since they have long made up their mind about their support for
such a position, whereas Republicans who are skeptical of the position at first end up being
convinced by the Court. The same could be said about conservative decisions. Republicans
might not respond to the Court’s reasoning in a conservative decision, but Democrats, who have
a lower level of support for the Court’s position to begin with, are eventually persuaded to
conform to the position of the Court.
Chapter 3. Experimental Design
I recruited 1487 respondents online via Lucid Fulcrum Exchange, which provides reliable
nationally representative samples similar to the demographic makeup of the United States.
(Coppock and McClellan 2019) Respondents were presented with a survey on the Qualtrics
survey software. Prior to the 1487-subject full study, a pilot study on 101 respondents was
conducted in the same way with the same survey instrument. Upon completion of the pilot study,
I pre-registered a full study with a targeted sample size of 1400 subjects on the American
Economic Association’s Randomized Controlled Trials Registry. Data analyses henceforth only
concern the 1487-subject full study and not the pilot study.
The first part of the survey was non-experimental and elicited the demographic
background of the respondents, including their age, gender, sexual orientation, LGBTQ+
affiliation, ethnicity, race, education, income, religion, religiosity, citizenship, partisanship,
ideology, political interest, and voter registration status.
The second, experimental part of the survey involved fact patterns on four Supreme Court
rulings. The existing political science literature on the legitimacy-conferring function of the
Supreme Court has provided little insight on which cases to select, as few studies precisely
justify their choice of case selection. In selecting these four cases, I sought to include four
distinct and important fields of debates in law that also involve issues common and controversial
in daily political life, so that the respondents can meaningfully engage with these judicial
decisions. I also looked toward Nicolson and Hansford (2014) and adopted all four issue areas
they used: LGBT rights, gun control, criminal justice, and campaign finance. I adopted their
choice of the three cases spanning the latter three areas and only changed the LGBT rights case
from Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010) to the more recent and perhaps more salient
Bostock v. Clayton County (2020). I rephrased the exact wording Nicolson and Hansford (2014)
used to describe the decision itself, as I thought of them as legally imprecise.2
1. Bostock v. Clayton County (2020): Employers cannot discriminate against employees
because of their sexual orientation or gender identity.
2. D.C. v. Heller (2008): The government cannot ban handguns or require trigger locks for
other types of guns.
3. Graham v. Florida (2010): Children below 18 years old cannot be sentenced to life in
prison without parole for any crime other than murder.
4. Citizens United v. FEC (2010): A for-profit corporation can spend as much money as it
wants to help political candidates win elections, as long as it is not directly donating to
their campaigns.
The respondents were randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions. I used
stratified randomization based on partisanship to better examine potential heterogeneous
treatment effects. After respondents finished the non-experimental questions, they were
categorized based on whether they are Democrats, Republicans, or Independents. Randomization
then occurred within each partisan group, so as to make sure partisanship is completely unrelated
to treatment status. Any respondents who are leaning Democrats or Republicans are categorized
as the respective partisans, and only those who indicate they don't feel closer to either party are
2 For example, their account of the Citizens United decision is: “Corporations and unions can spend as much money
as they want to help political candidates win elections.” That is not exactly precise given the important caveat that
there remain strong limitations on the amount of direct contribution to a political campaign that is allowed. The
Court was only ruling on independent expenditure.
categorized as Independents (that is, they are categorized as point 4 on a 7-point partisanship
score). Simple randomization was adopted since the respondents were not randomized until they
finished non-experimental questions on their demographics first.
In the control group, the respondent read a simple policy statement summarizing the
position that the Court took in the particular case, with no mentioning of the Court whatsoever;
for the first treatment group, there was a policy statement and the Court's endorsement of it,
simply adding "the Supreme Court recently ruled that" before the policy statement; for the
second treatment group, there was a policy statement and the Court's reasoning in support of the
policy. The reasoning appeared in the form of a one-paragraph brief in lay language. It did not
include any mention of the Court itself, but rather solely focused on summarizing the reasoning
that the Court provided in its majority opinion; Finally, the third treatment group was presented
with the policy statement with both the Court's endorsement and reasoning.
Each respondent would be assigned to the same treatment condition across the four cases
to avoid interference and speculation of the project’s intent. Case order was fixed according to
the above itemized list, with one liberal decision followed by a conservative decision, then
another liberal decision followed by another conservative decision. There was no randomization
of case order since the important outcome variable is the average effect of four cases. After each
condition was presented, the respondent would indicate her level of support for the particular
policy statement on a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. This factorial design
allows me to compare the legitimacy-conferring function of the Court through three different
channels — mere endorsement, mere reasoning, or the combination of both — and discern which
of them is the most influential in swaying public opinion.









Since the Court’s reasoning is so crucial to the substantive contribution of this project, it
warranted extra caution to draft and assign. The four one-paragraph reasoning briefs were written
on the basis of the Court’s majority opinions as well as case briefs available online that highlight
the key points in those opinions. They were also reviewed and approved by a New York-based
junior associate attorney at Covington and Burling LLP and recent Harvard Law School graduate
as being truthful and accurate in reflecting the meaning of the Court’s opinions.
To adjust for the rather big difference in length between the prompts that the Control
group and Treatment 1 group respondents were reading and the prompts that the Treatment 2 and
3 group respondents were reading due to the reasoning briefs, I filled in four different paragraphs
of instructions explaining what a policy stance is for the Control group and Treatment 1 group.
As the following sample instruction from the LGBT question shows, these instructions are
lengthy but almost completely devoid of substantive content or meaning.
“The following prompt is a policy stance about employment discrimination that you will
be asked to evaluate based on your opinion. A policy stance is a statement about a certain issue
that may involve policymaking or policy implementation in the United States, concerning issues
that may be dealt with by the executive, legislative, or judicial branches across different levels of
government. The policy stance may involve social, economic, and/or political questions that you
might or might not be familiar with. Please respond to each of the given statements according to
how you personally view the policy stance.”
Next, I present all four case questions as seen by the Treatment 3 group and explain what
other groups saw instead, given the importance of legibility of the reasoning briefs and therefore
their accessibility for regular Americans. The Control group saw the lengthy instruction and the
underlined policy statement; the Treatment 1 group saw the lengthy instruction, the bolded
sentence of “the Supreme Court recently ruled,” followed by the underlined policy statement; the
Treatment 2 group saw the reasoning, followed by “based on this reasoning,” and the underlined
policy statement, without mentioning the Court.
Graph 1, Treatment Group 3 LGBT Prompt
Graph 2, Treatment Group 3 Gun Prompt
Graph 3, Treatment Group 3 Prison Prompt
Graph 4, Treatment Group 3 Campaign Finance Prompt
As shown here, the legal reasoning of different cases inherently has a greater level of
heterogeneity than simple policy statements. While policy statements already vary in terms of
how polarizing, salient, or relevant they are, legal reasoning could also be more or less technical
in nature, emotional and expressive in style or not, etc. Legal reasoning could have any number
of characteristics that are hard to precisely quantify and therefore experimentally manipulated,
but they all could matter for persuasive purposes. This should be especially noted for future
research.
The key dependent variables on the four case questions were coded on a scale of 1 to 5,
with 1 being “strongly agree,” and 5 being “strongly disagree.” Therefore, a negative coefficient
on the questions related to the four cases shows a greater level of support for the Court’s
position. After the experimental questions, the respondent was then asked to indicate her feeling
toward the Supreme Court on a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 being the most warm or favorable.
She would also indicate whether she agrees that “the Supreme Court should have the final word
to say on American laws,” in order to measure her support for judicial review.
At the end of the survey, I used an attention check question, asking the respondent to
choose “somewhat disagree” in the prototypical 5-point scale. This was left for last to avoid
respondents who didn’t pay attention until now to start consistently clicking “somewhat
disagree” from now on just out of a force of habit. However, since this attention check question
was done post-treatment, I do not exclude those who failed the attention check in my subsequent
data analysis. Analyses conducted on the samples excluding and including those who failed the
attention check produce very similar results and all the statistically significant results shown
below are robust regardless of the exact sample. Finally, I also asked the respondent if she had
guessed the intent of the study and gave her a chance to elaborate on her own if answered “yes.”
Although most of the respondents attempted to do so, none of them correctly guessed the intent
of the study as being the impact of the Court’s reasoning on public opinion.
Chapter 4. Results3
From the full sample of 1487 respondents, I eliminate those who answered “no” to being
a citizen or permanent resident, or who didn’t answer this question, and those who didn’t enter
randomization to answer any key dependent variable questions. This would leave a sample of
1399 respondents, with which all data analyses are conducted here.
I first show the average of the effects from the four cases on this sample, including the
baseline model, a model controlling for partisanship, a model controlling for demographics, and
a fourth model controlling for all pre-treatment covariates. Given the aforementioned heightened
level of heterogeneity inherent to legal reasoning, pooling together the four cases to produce
such a mean score would provide a better measure of the effect of the Court’s endorsement or
reasoning. All four cases are scored and coded in the same way on a scale of 1 to 5, with a lower
score meaning a higher level of support for the Court’s position. Negative coefficients suggest
increasing support for the Court’s position.
3 Unless otherwise noted, all data analyses that are conducted (including eliminating outliers) were pre-registered.
Table 2
As expected from Nicolson and Hansford (2014), Treatment 1 with simple Court
endorsement has little effect. Treatment 2 and 3, however, both have statistically significant and
robust positive effects on support for the policy position adopted by the Court, regardless of
model specifications.
This leads me to analyze results as divided by partisanship to examine any heterogeneous
treatment effects, as stratified randomization was conducted on this basis. The reason why there
appear to be more Democrats than Republicans and few Independents is that Independents are
categorized as so only if they are coded as 4 on a 7-point partisanship scale. Self-identified
Independents who “feel closer” to either party are still categorized as partisans.
Table 3
Democrats, rather than Republicans or Independents, are responding to the Court’s
reasoning and changing their public opinion according to the position that the Court adopted.
Next, I break down the four cases into two liberal and two conservative decisions to examine
how partisans and Independents respond differently to them. The liberal decisions include the
ones on LGBT rights and criminal justice, whereas the conservative decisions include the ones
on gun control and campaign finance.
Table 4
Table 5
Democrats are responding to the Court’s conservative reasoning by conforming to the
Court’s positions (negative coefficients in Treatment 2 and 3, Table 4), but not Republicans or
Independents. For the liberal cases, reasoning has no effect on any of the three groups.
However, Republicans seem to backlash against the Court’s endorsement of liberal cases
in Treatment 1 and decrease their support for the policy position (positive coefficient in
Treatment 1, Table 5). Republicans seem repugnant against these liberal cases and reasoning. As
the coefficients for the Court’s effects on Democrats are always negative, meaning Democrats
conform to the Court’s position no matter if it is a liberal or conservative case, such coefficients
for Republicans on liberal cases and reasoning are positive, meaning Republicans might backlash
against liberal rulings and reasoning.
To contextualize the size of these substantive effects, I look toward the mean control
group agreement score. To be sure, on conservative decisions, Democrats changed their opinion
by 0.432 and 0.335 in Treatment 2 and 3 groups, respectively, in the direction of the Court’s
ruling, on a scale of 1 to 5 (8.64 percentage points and 6.7 percentage points). There was only a
difference of 0.6 between Democrats and Republicans to begin with for the control group on that
same scale (12 percentage points).
As for the Republican backlash against the Court’s endorsement of liberal cases, that
effect is 0.277 on a scale of 1 to 5 (5.54 percentage points). The initial difference between level
of support among Democrats and Republicans on liberal cases is 0.204 (4.08 percentage points).
That is to say, the Court’s endorsement more than doubled the cleavage between Democrats and
Republicans on liberal cases.
Concerning my second hypothesis that the Court’s reasoning could have a positive impact
on favorability toward the Court, I find no such evidence. In fact, I find some evidence
suggesting the contrary effect for Republicans. Table 6 shows that the Republicans in Treatment
3 group actually decreased their level of favorability toward the Court by 5.4 percentage points,
an effect with a p-value smaller than 0.1.
Table 6
It is extremely curious why Republicans who learn of the Court’s reasoning and
endorsement would like the Court less, since six of the nine justices sitting on the current
Supreme Court were appointed by Republican presidents. I can only speculate that Republicans
are so repugnant against the Court’s endorsement of and reasoning for liberal positions that
exposure to this information makes them disfavor the Court in general. The answers elicited in
the last question on the survey, which asked what the respondent thought the intent of the study
was, might provide some anecdotal evidence for this conjecture. Most respondents provided
short answers to the likes of “constitutional rights,” “the Supreme Court,” or “public opinion,”
though no respondents correctly guessed the study intent was the causal effect of the Court’s
reasoning. However, several respondents complained that the study was about, and I quote,
“woke liberal stupidity,” “liberal bias from an ultra liberal college,” and “the commies are doing
what they always have; which is, trying to take away freedoms.” Noticeably, there were no
equivalent grievances expressed by liberal respondents against such sentiments as “same-old
same-old conservative idiocy.”
Lastly, I show that there is little, if any, interactive effect between the Court’s
endorsement and reasoning. The Court’s reasoning is doing the heavy lifting, overall speaking.
Table 7
All of the above findings on partisanship-based heterogeneous treatment effects must be
interpreted with the important distinction between confirmatory and exploratory research. That is
to say, I had an ex ante hypothesis on how the Court’s reasoning would influence public opinion
to conform to the Court’s position and found evidence to support this in general, but I had no
such hypothesis when it comes to how partisanship interacts with this effect. This especially
cautions against drawing any conclusions regarding the potential backlash effect that the Court’s
liberal endorsement could have on Republicans’ level of support for those liberal positions. This
effect is also not nearly as robust as the effect of the Court's conservative reasoning on the
Democrats. The former effect is no longer statistically significant if I use the sample that
excludes those who failed the attention check question, but the latter effect is statistically
significant regardless how I exclude potential outliers. That being said, the fact that the Court’s
liberal endorsement, reasoning, and both combined all had a positive coefficient and therefore
potential backlash effect on Republicans’ support for those liberal positions is worth noting.
These exploratory results, combined with the potential backlash effect that the Court’s
endorsement and reasoning might have on Republicans’ favorability of the Court, are still highly
suggestive. They should be used to guide future confirmatory research, rather than serve as prima
facie evidence.
Given these considerations, my next chapter will focus on discussing results for the main
pre-registered hypothesis for which I found supportive evidence, namely, that exposure to the
Court’s authentic legal reasoning could increase popular support for the Court’s position overall.
My analysis also suggests that this is mostly driven by Democrats responding to the Court’s
reasoning in conservative cases.
Chapter 5. Discussion
Using an online survey experiment, I find that exposure to the legal reasoning of the
Supreme Court generally increases popular support for the Court’s adopted policy positions. This
effect is mostly driven by Democrats conforming to the Court’s conservative positions upon
learning about the specific reasoning.
By using a factorial design with the Court’s endorsement and reasoning as treatment
arms, this study suggests one way to explain why earlier observational research uncovered
evidence suggesting various effects that the Court’s ruling could have on public opinion,
positively, structurally, or conditionally, yet later experimental studies sometimes found no
effects whatsoever. These findings are not inherently contradictory. As far as using the Supreme
Court as just the source cue is concerned, following Nicholson and Hansford (2014), the present
study reaffirms with another nationally representative sample that this likely does little to
increase popular support for the given policy.
Ultimately, whether a survey experiment on this topic obtains results of statistical
significance highly depends on the exact prompt that was given to the respondents. In Baas and
Thomas (1984), respondents read just policy statements with varying source cues, and they
found no effects in terms of the Court’s legitimacy-conferring function; in Clawson et al. (2001),
however, they used a survey instrument that mimicked a newspaper story. They varied not only
the source cue of the policy stance — the Supreme Court or the bureaucracy, but also who was
quoted in the story — Justice O’Connor or the head of the Department of Education, for
example. Even if the quote was exactly the same in content, this makes the two news articles no
longer exactly comparable, since the well-respected reputation of Justice O’Connor could have a
much bigger influence on public opinion than having the little-known Education Secretary as the
source cue. These details in the experimental design can make all the difference in results.
Comparing Baas and Thomas (1984) to Clawson et al. (2001) and considering the present
study, I suggest that what could truly make an impact on public opinion is not the Court’s simple
endorsement of a policy, but rather contextual information relevant to the Court’s
decision-making. In the case of Clawson et al. (2001), this meant quoting Justice O’Connor in a
fictitious news article advocating for the Court’s decision; in the present study, this means the
Court’s legal reasoning. Such information makes the survey experimental setting just a little
more akin to the real world, in which the Court brings about heightened media exposure and
public discourse of the issues it rules upon and sets in motion all the other unforeseen effects.
This is why observational research finds the Court to be impactful on public opinion, while
whether experimental research can recover such effects depends on whether the exact survey
prompts include contextual information about the legal decisions as opposed to simply using the
Court as the source cue of a given policy position.
The theoretical contribution of this study is also fundamentally characterized by putting
the persuasive strength of the Court’s authentic legal reasoning to test among regular Americans.
Existing literature has ignored this persuasive instrument that the Court explicitly uses for
making itself heard and understood. Experimental research in this area commonly employs
poorly justified fact patterns or even hypothetical prompts. As the Court hopes to convince
anyone who would listen via its opinion reasoning, it is worth answering whether the Court’s
legal reasoning actually works. On average, it does.
Chapter 6. Conclusion
Following the discussion about the methodological and substantive context in which this
study was conducted, I turn to propose some directions for future research.
For starters, there needs to be a more principled way of studying the Court’s
legitimacy-conferring function with particular attention to the way different issue areas may well
interact differently with respondents’ demographics. Due to limits of funding, the present study,
unfortunately, follows many of its observational and experimental predecessors in drawing rather
broad inferences from just a few judicial decisions. A better way of studying this would be to, for
example, pool together all Supreme Court decisions from the past five or so years, eliminate the
decisions rooted in legal technicalities that take too much prior knowledge to comprehend, and
randomize for the respondents to each see four or so cases.
Secondly, the dissenting opinion reasoning could also be researched in the same way as
this study. A powerful dissenting opinion might put an effective check on the majority opinion
reasoning and attenuate the effect that the majority opinion could have on public opinion.
Salamone (2014) focuses on whether the majority size in the decision influences public support
for the ruling. Compared to unanimous ruling, dissent can foster acceptance of rulings among the
Court's opponents by suggesting evidence of procedural justice. The reasoning provided by the
dissenting opinion should be studied along with this framework.
Finally, a more careful examination of the interaction between the Court’s
legitimacy-conferring function through the endorsement of or reasoning for particular decisions
and partisanship should be conducted. As the present study found that Democrats conform to
conservative reasoning whereas Republicans might backlash against liberal decisions, replication
studies to confirm exploratory results would be especially beneficial.
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